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Abstract
There is wide agreement that background knowledge is unconsciously applied and is not for-
mally representable, but views diverge as to whether this sort of skill should be considered
knowledge in the proper sense. In this paper I attempt to show that background infrastructure
is a type of skilled knowledge which serves as a precondition for the mind to be ‘about’ things
in the world. Contrary to the common understanding that background is primarily mechani-
cal, the view presented here affirms that it as a totality of knowing taken up by the body and
converted into an implicit ‘know-how’. It appears as a mode of mind’s ‘enworldment’, as well
as an organ of potentiality.
Introduction: Towards a Broader Picture of the Mind
That the first thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition habitually saw
everything in terms of one or several elements (be that water, earth, air,
fire or whatever), with a view to understanding complex phenomena by fi-
guring out their constitutive parts and forms of organization, is a burden for
the history of philosophy. From this tradition one is tempted to mistakenly
conclude that ‘to be made of’ implies ‘to be’, and that familiarity with struc-
tural forms and functional laws is equivalent to possessing an exhaustive
explanation of the object under consideration. If the object is the mind,
then one might believe that one can fully understood it once one knows
how the underlying processes of its operations are organized and what the
make-up of its ‘hardware’ is.
It is probably because this sort of identification is so ingrained as an ex-
planatory model that we have become insensitive to its errors. This also ac-
counts for the fact, at least in part, that many a contemporary scientist and
philosopher of mind readily declares, without much opposition, that mat-
ter, form and function are all that matter in understanding the mind. For if
structure and function define what the mind is, then there is nothing else
that really counts.
So long as one assumes that we must see the mind in terms of something
else, and hence that the mind is always something else, there will be no re-
strictions to the reductionist project. On this score, the whole can be de-
fined in terms of, and identified with, a single element or aspect. The
metonymic taking of a part or aspect for the whole has such a long tradi-
tion that we do not easily realize that we now have a sort of caricature
which errs against a more holistic perspective. Indeed, we have here a con-
temporary equivalent of the ancient Greek schema of ‘four elements’ in
one – the ‘it’, and ‘it’ is habitually further decomposed into more elemen-
tary units all the way down to molecules and atoms. The subsequent out-
come is the conclusion that the mind is ‘nothing but’ and ‘no more than’
that to which ‘it’ can be decomposed (neurons, molecules). The philosophi-
cal rhetoric of ‘nothing but’ and ‘no more than’ first applies the metonymic
pars pro toto, and then eventually forgets what has been done. Thus the
whole of the mind dissolves into, or is reduced to, the deliberately chosen
aspect – and in some cases it even disappears altogether.
Though reductionists would probably say that their claims are not ontologi-
cal, their analytic techniques are exclusive; and to leave no possibility of
misunderstanding, in special cases they declare that their procedure is also
‘eliminative’. The properties of the mind are not only selected and then ex-
plained away, but that which is selected is deemed the sufficient basis for
determining what the mind is or might be as a whole.
During the past five decades or so, we have become extensively exposed to
the idea that the mind, and the brain alike, is always something else.1 »Be-
cause we do not understand the brain very well,« asserts Searle, »we are
constantly tempted to use the latest technology as a model for trying to un-
derstand it« (1984: 44), and we thereby tend to do the same with the mind.
Because our understanding of the mind is still rich with ‘mysteries’ and
poor with positive knowledge, we design models of the mind according to
the available technical and methodological means.
Common to reductionisms of all sorts, which exhibit a strong demand for
(natural) scientific explanations, theorists in the field disavow everything
that might have even the slightest trait of the psychological. The ensuing
result is a conception of the mind that is nothing but the product of matter:
a ‘self’ which is in the service of the ‘it’, a structure without life, an ‘archite-
cture’ (of the mind) without a past and lacking development, often dismis-
sive of either personal history or collective dynamics. The mind is an
encapsulated entity – that is, closed and self-contained, without interactive
coupling with the world – and, as a rule, is described as asocial, disembo-
died, emotionless and cultureless. The outermost bounds of the intellectual
challenge are marked, on the one hand, by the absence of the embodied
person (brains-in-vats) and, on the other, by the view that bodily stature
suggests a lack of personhood (zombie).
In other versions the mind is reduced to, and then identified with, the
brain; with a computer program; with the system of internal functional
(input-output) relations; with dispositional responses to stimuli, and so on.
This is indicative of how we stumbled across the positions of brain-mind
identity theory, computationalism, functionalism and behaviorism.
The consequence of a theoretical strategy of this sort is by no means trivial.
For by adhering to it, scientists of the mind are not only confusing the part
for the whole, and a singularized aspect for a complex unity, but they more
often than not, though perhaps unwittingly, leave the mind out of sight.
And this in turn places a demand on theorists in the field to look for a
broader picture of the mind.
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1. The ‘Enworlded’ Mind
In view of diverse confusions in the science and philosophy of mind, the
mind is considered ‘lost’, and then ‘found’ or ‘rediscovered’2 again. And the
search for it continues. As already mentioned, one direction leads to re-
ductionism; another leads to the opposite pole characterized by the phe-
nomenological approach. In the final analysis, the first ends in the neural or
silicon atomization of the mind; the latter comes closer to a ‘big picture’ of
mind insofar as it affirms a fundamental phenomenological theme – the
openness of the mind to the world and its ‘situation’ of being-in-the-world.
The approach that I am going to explore here is also world-oriented. Its
basic premise, in a nutshell, reads: the notion of a worldless mind is ficti-
tious, as is the notion of a mindless world.
The view I advance asserts that the mind is ‘rediscovered’ in its ‘enworld-
ment’, which is to say its capacity to render the world intelligible. It is es-
sential to stress in this context that »[i]t is impossible to characterize men-
tal properties adequately without invoking the world with which our mind
is inextricably concerned« (Auyang, 2000: 82). My claim, however, is even
stronger: not only is the mind ‘open’ to the world, it is impossible to con-
ceive the mind as being devoid of the world. The world, namely, is a di-
mension of the mind. In short, there is no world without the mind, but also
no worldless mind.
One way to make the above position clearer is to recall Merleau-Ponty’s
statement that »[t]here is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in
the world does he know himself« (1945: xi). This contrasts sharply with the
traditional philosophical assumption that world and mind are two inde-
pendent entities. Once the dichotomy is established, much philosophical
effort is required to bridge the chasm, both epistemologically and ontologi-
cally, and this is in principle futile. For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand,
there is no ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reality, no inner world of the psyche and
outer world of objects. Thus there is no need to construct bridges, and no
revision of the dichotomy is required because none is presupposed.
Needless to say, mind-world interdependence is more profound than the
ecological perspective. To be more precise, human being is not in-the-
-world in exactly the same way as one is in one’s environment. The former
is to be understood along the lines of the Heideggerian Dasein as in-der-
Welt-sein which avoids the pitfalls of dualism and reveals Cartesian inter-
mediary representations as untenable. If one follows the phenomenological
path of rediscovering the mind, then one might be well advised to consider
Merleau-Ponty’s impelling words: »My body is geared into the world«
(1945: 250). Or Hubert L. Dreyfus’ version of the same thought: »[T]he
whole organism (is) geared into the whole world«.3 By bringing the organ-
ism – that is, the body and the mind – into the world, one has gained a sig-
nificantly new stance. But with it a problem arises: How does the (whole)
organism relate to the (whole) world? This question generates numerous
related questions, such as whether the ‘organism’ enables our being-in-the-
world, and whether ‘enworldment’ is the exclusive merit of embodiment.
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Without wanting to get bogged down in a detailed analysis of all the ques-
tions involved, I would say that we are in the world not only by virtue of
our bodily gearing into it, but also by virtue of our acts of mental engage-
ment.4 Insofar as we think and feel, desire and guess, imagine and hope, we
leave our cognitive trace on everything knowable, and thus we imprint our
cognitive stamp on the world as a total product of knowing. Even seeing is
not an act of up-taking, but a means of molding the world in a particular
way. Insofar as we perceive and speak, measure and calculate, and even
dream and fantasize, write sonnets and compose sonatas, we leave the
blueprints of our doing on that which becomes our world. And in this
sense, it is philosophically – and above all epistemologically – justified to
assert that the human mind is not only ‘enworlded’, but that the human
world is also ‘mindful’.
2. Beyond the ‘Attention Room’
One way to approach the mind-world relation may be to consider the ac-
counts of a neuroscientist, a biologist and other ‘hard’ scientists. Paul Ehr-
lich and Robert Ornstein put it this way:
»Modern analysis of the nervous system and the mind yields a surprising conclusion: instead
of experiencing the world as it is, people experience only about one trillionth of outside
events: a small world indeed!« (1989: 73)
Though the finding itself may be amazing, the way it is interpreted is ill-
founded. When these two authors claim that »the ‘big’ outside world
doesn’t enter in directly« (73), they presuppose that there is a world apart
from the mind, and that the mind is independent of the world. The major
issue, then, concerns just how the big (external) world matches the small
(internal) one.
»Our sensory systems do this by restricting incoming data to very little of what is actually pres-
ent in the outside world. And our minds therefore must extract from the received cacophony
of the entire ‘big’ world a specialized ‘small world’ in which an individual can act and live.«
(72)
Ornstein and Ehrlich are right if what they say implies a reduced scale for
mental world – but they are wrong if they think that both worlds are
(pre)given, and that the number of stimuli determines their ‘size’.
The source of the misconception consists in the assumption that it is the
quantity of sensations that decides on how ‘big’ a world can be, which is to
say that it is the amount of data which dictates its complexity. The assump-
tion would be right only if information or meanings are provided by exter-
nal sources which are contained in the incoming sensory data. That, how-
ever, is not the case; for meanings emerge within the mind and at the level
of the cognitive subject. They are not imported from without, and are cer-
tainly not provided in a ready-made fashion. Instead, they are created, so
to speak, out of the mind’s own cloth. It is the mind’s art of interpreting, its
capacity to make stimuli meaningful, which renders the world intelligible
for us. Thus sensory adequacy and empirical faithfulness cannot be meas-
ured against external standards, and their status is to be decided within in-
ternally created criteria.
The world is neither big nor small; it is neither intelligible nor unfeasible
according to what is given in the ‘input’. Rather, its ‘size’, complexity and
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intelligibility are dependent on the mental ability to make it either big or
small, either intelligible or unfeasible. In this kind of process it may just be
that too much data is unmanageable, whilst scarce and fragmentary data is
useful. As a rule, the ‘it’ and the ‘self’ have problems with an overflow of
‘information’ because they cannot meaningfully process them all. At the
same time, they feel at ease with partial data, missing connections, with
fuzziness and uncertainties, and even with a lack of ‘essential’ parts of data
(such as the ‘blind sight’).
The amount of (sensible) data does not exhibit any particular advantage
for our metal powers, nor is deficient or fragmentary stimulation necessar-
ily a handicap. ‘More’ stimuli does not automatically produce more com-
plex mental contents; for if this were the case, then perception, and know-
ledge alike, would be nothing but a collection or summation of such data.
Accordingly, the attempt to extend the ‘one trillionth of data’ limit, and the
attempt to thereby be receptive of an ever greater number of stimuli, is not
that which would extend our world or increase our cognitive competence.
Similarly, it would be futile to try to infinitely augment our vocabulary to
obtain an all-encompassing language that would faithfully match ‘reality’.
It would also be illusory for the mind to try to record everything which is
mentally possible. Such an imaginary (‘ideal’) language would not only be
so monumental that it would be impossible to memorize, but would also
lack meaning. And the mind for which everything would be relevant would
not only collapse under the burden of data, but its task would also lack
meaning. Indeed, meaning can only be established through repeated usage,
and repetition can only occur within a limited vocabulary. And as we already
know from the philosophy of perception: no meaning, no perception. The
analogy holds for our mental life in toto: no meaning, no conscious or other
mental states.
So it seems that a limited mental stage is a prerequisite for mental pro-
cesses which are meaningful for the organism, especially since a limited vo-
cabulary is the precondition for successful language usage. To convey this
idea further, consider the following metaphor of the ‘attention room’ as re-
ferring to the restricted stage for ongoing mental events.
Since it refers to conscious states, the ‘attention room’ is never empty. Ac-
cording to what we know from neuroscience, the brain is never at rest, not
even in sleep, and our ‘self’ is always active, constantly receiving and recy-
cling mental contents – and thus generating self-organizing processes
which are capable of producing content that is a distant cry from the initial
‘input’. Yet the ‘attention room’ cannot be unlimitedly crowded either. Too
much of everything is tantamount to nothing. Not everything can be rele-
vant. Also, there is no way a mental state can be about something if it is not
focused, and it can be focused only if it functions on a reduced scale, which
enables the delineation of particular meanings against all potential meanings.
We now realize that it is crucial for conscious mental states (the ‘attention
room’) to be limited, but we also know that we feel free and unlimited with
respect to what we think, wish or guess. The question then arises: How do
we reconcile the indisputable feeling that we are mentally unbounded and
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the fact that the conscious mental arena is necessarily limited if mental
events are to be meaningful for the cognitive person? I will attempt to an-
swer this question by focusing on what I call the ‘background infrastruc-
ture’.
3. The Background Infrastructure:
An Outline
It is generally agreed that background mental abilities are non-representa-
tional.5 To this I would add that background skill is applied unconsciously.
Disagreements might arise, however, concerning the way we understanding
skill as not conforming to representation, on the one hand, and whether or
not the unconscious infrastructure involved should be taken as a kind of
knowledge, on the other hand.
Regarding skill, habitual illustration of the background includes examples
of ‘swimming’, ‘riding a bicycle’, ‘driving a car’, ‘typewriting’, ‘cutting cake’
or ‘cutting wood’, as well as other daily automatized actions which do not
appear in the ‘attention room’, for which no extra mental effort is needed.
All of them, as a rule, primarily refer to motor skills. Though philosophical
consensus on interpreting skills as merely physical (mechanical) abilities is
fairly broad, my view does not conform to the tradition. I would venture to
assert that skills (routine and automatized) can also be mental abilities and
forms of action whose sophistication belongs to the category of ‘knowing-
-that’.
This position differs significantly from Searle’s, who notes that
»… [i]n order that I can now have the intentional states that I do I must have certain kinds of
‘know-how’: I must know how things are and I must know how to do things, but the kinds of
‘know-how’ in question are not, in these cases, forms of ‘knowing-that’«. (1983: 143)
I maintain, however, that motor skills not only traverse the painstaking
path from rules to routine, and are thus not only indicative of ‘know-how’,
but that everything we can learn can be turned into a skill. By that I do not
only mean something like playing a music instrument, which is a type of in-
termediary example between motor skill and ‘knowing-that’. I also include
human capacities such as perceiving and language usage. Just as a cello-
player and pianist can make his/her performance (and profession) be about
music only after he/she has acquired the necessary performative skills, so
too ordinary perceivers and speakers can make their images and sentences
be about their lived-world only after they have become adequately trained
and educated in both skills. Indeed, the supreme aim of all knowing is for it
to become an automatized routine or skill. Yet in its transfiguration into a
skill, knowledge does not cease to be knowledgeable. By way of conversion
into ‘know-how’, much of the ‘know-that’ can be preserved.
Here we are confronted with the problematic exclusiveness of ‘know-that’
and ‘know-how’ which, though helpful at times, is harmful insofar as it
does not allow for mutual interdependence and exchange between these
two types of knowing. It should be noted, however, that the conflict exists
not because it is actually there, but because it has been created. On a
broader scale, this leads to a polarization between explicit and implicit
knowing, between the exact and the tacit, between reason and emotion,
and in the final instance between art and science as two ‘incommensurable
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rivals’.6 All these divisions have been with us for a long time, and precious
little effort has gone into revising them.
Even the greatest discoveries and creative achievements lose their ‘great-
ness’ with time and repeated use, as one becomes less conscious of their
importance, and even of their presence, after which they slowly become
part of common-sense usage (first within the scientific community, and
then outside it). Just as syntax gets hard-wired, so too our knowledge of the
availability of water and food, for instance, or the convenience of using ar-
tificial light through electricity, or the ease of speedy communication and
transportation, become skilled forms of implicit knowing which is not to be
found anywhere in textbooks.
Questions regarding background as a form of knowing usually converge on
the dilemma as to whether or not such a skill should be considered know-
ledge – in short, as to whether or not ‘knowing how’ is knowing at all. The
»most important part of commonsense knowledge,« states Herbert L.
Dreyfus, »is not ‘knowledge’ at all but a skill« (Baumgartner & Payr, 1995:
77), and this implies that skill is a particular sort of competence that can-
not be equated with knowledge. Indeed, if skill is used primarily to refer to
car-driving, cake-cutting and other everyday acts, as is frequently the case
in the philosophical literature, then we might be tempted to put the word
‘knowledge’ in these specific contexts in quotation marks, suggesting that it
is not knowledge in the proper sense of the word. If, on the other hand, a
skill is to be taken not merely as a physical or mechanical ability, but as a
totality of cognitive practices taken up by the body, then such an educated
embodiment can rightly be treated as knowledge. ‘Knowing how’ would
then be a kind of knowing after all.
On this score, Dreyfus likewise claims that
»… nowhere in the Encyclopedia Britannica does it say that people move forward more easily
than they move backward, or that doctors wear underwear, as John Searle’s latest example
goes. The background knowledge is precisely what is not in an encyclopedia. It is what every
person knows just by growing up in our culture. And a lot of it is not even facts.« (Baumgartner
& Payr, 1995: 75–76)
Dreyfus’ example – »people move forward more easily than they move
backward« – and Searle’s example – »doctors wear underwear« – seem to
me to refer to a particular type of information, and not so much to a special
kind of skill or knowledge. However, I think it is just a matter of selection
criteria that two things do not (yet) exist as entries in textbooks. But I do
not see why they cannot be included. An entry on the spatial orientation of
humans might, and probably should, contain the experience – and even the
‘fact’ – that we move forwards easier than backwards, that we move more
easily by walking on our feet than on our hands (and there are certainly
convincing explanations for that from the evolutionary point of view). And
doctors wearing underwear might be a topic of discussion on the ‘dress
code’ in surgery. What is probably meant by the above examples is that we
do not need an encyclopedia for doing any of the mentioned activities.
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Without the skill of converting practice into patterns, and rules into routi-
nes, it would be impossible to maintain mental life. If nothing is skilled,
then everything would be relevant; and this would not only be burdensome
to our memory, but the effect would also be that nothing would be mean-
ingful and relevant. It is certainly a good thing that we do not have to con-
sciously control »standing, walking, opening and closing doors, manipulat-
ing bottles, glass, refrigerators, opening, poring and drinking«.7 But far
more important than this is that we do not have to be conscious of the
many mental processes which have progressed to the level of skill, and
which enable, for instance, specific phonetic configurations to be about
meaningful words, and retinal patterns to be about images.
4. Reading as Background Skill
One basic lesson we can learn from perception is that there is no ‘naked’ or
‘naïve’ eye which is capable of seeing. Stated otherwise, there is no seeing
without interpreting and understanding. Required is a competent inter-
preter because meanings are not provided or given ready-made in visual
stimuli; they are acquired only by the cognitive person, and then turned
into a skill. Only for a skilled perceiver, namely, can mental processes be
about the seen. To put it yet another way, perception can function the way
it does because there is a background infrastructure which provides the
competence for seeing. Only the ‘skilled eye’ can see. For if it were other-
wise, then it would be sufficient to open one’s eyes to see, and the contents
of visual experience would be the same for everyone. And this is obviously
not the case.
I now want to apply the lesson from perception to a very special case, the
case of reading. The art of figuring out that which is written is more sophis-
ticated than wood-cutting and cake-cutting. It demonstrates that back-
ground skills are not only mechanical, but show that reading actually repre-
sents the nature and import of the background more adequately. This fas-
cinating ability of ours, by which we convert the graphical into contents of
thought and feelings, is pretty much a neglected ability in the science and
philosophy of mind, and thus deserves more sustained theoretical attention.
Perhaps the most elementary thing about reading is that it is not about
(usually black) letters on a (usually white) piece of paper or screen, and it
is not about the string of words and filled-in pages either. Reading is a
complex mental act in which the skilled recognition of written signs helps
us to create mental contents – thoughts, emotions, images and imagined
realities. It is about complex games of affiliation between graphic signs
taken as symbols and our competence to make use of them in a particular
meaningful way so that they become intentionally relevant. We do not read
texts by encoding strings of symbols one by one, letter by letter; and we do
not read complex texts word by word. It might well be appropriate to say
that reading is always holistic.
Once we have acquired the adequate reading skill, in reading we not only
pick up signs, but we are also not consciously concerned with lines of words
or with ‘pages’. For that reason, we do not say that we see the text, but that
we read it. Texts are not to be looked at; they are meant to be read. And we
can read a text from left to right, from right to left, as is the case in Arabic,
or again bottom-up, as is the case in Japanese. A book can be read front-
back, or back-front, but that does not influence the reading. For reading is
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not about the way we look at letters, nor is it about techniques of writing or
printing. Types of letters, font and colors do not matter – for one might use
red or fluorescent for highlighting without influencing the act of reading –
since reading goes beyond seeing the printed pages. In reading, we nor-
mally do not remember what the previous page of the book looks like.
Rather, we remember what it was about. As soon as one develops the skill,
which normally happens early on in childhood, reading is not about the let-
ters any more; it is about the contents they evoke mentally.
Knowing this much about reading explains why authors are such poor
proofreaders of their own writings – precisely because it is difficult for
them to concentrate on the written text, on the graphic signs out of which it
is composed, and ignore what those graphic signs are about. Indeed, the
skill of converting signs into imaginary mental contents is so deeply ‘back-
grounded’ that it requires extra mental energy to neglect the meanings and
see the ‘written’ as it is visually laid down.
Since the animal symbolicum is so skilled in interpreting, he/she cannot re-
sist permanently deciphering signs and symbols. We are, as symbol-making
‘animals’, only aware of what texts are about, and are insensitive to what
there is literally ‘in front of’ our eyes. The aboutness of the text is primary;
the sensibly given can only be derived with extra effort, and even then it is
often difficult to bring it out to the ‘foreground’ from the background.
The same is also true of auditive perception. It is difficult, and indeed im-
possible, to hear spoken language as vocalized noise, and not as words and
sentences. Even an exotic foreign language of which we do not have the
slightest clue is heard as an incomprehensible language, and not as a vocal
mass. As Heidegger succinctly pointed out, »[i]t requires a very artificial
and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’« (1926: 163). It is
equally difficult to hear music not as a melodic piece, but as a conglomera-
tion of tones. Even avant-garde musical performance is heard as ‘music’ of
which we have no understanding, rather than as a completely amorphous
acoustic mass. The primacy of aboutness is applicable here too.
What follows is a process whereby we read in the meanings rather than de-
code them from the stimuli. The same holds true for perception, be that
visual, auditive, olfactory, tactile or gustatory. For in perceptual experi-
ence, we read in the possible significations they might have for the cogni-
tive person. In perception in general, and in reading in particular, what
matters is expectation. And we can have expectations only because we have
a background infrastructure permanently at our disposal and are skilled in
making use of it. It is owing to background skill, namely, that we navigate
through our life-world instantaneously and effortlessly, without recourse to
computation. And it is for this reason that ‘real time’ is so unbeatably
short.
Once we realize that reading is not of the visual (or tactile) decoding of the
sensibly given, but is about imaginary mental events, and that all percep-
tion is based on projected expectations, which make us meaningfully tuned
to intentional objects,8 further possible implications can be extracted. And
this concerns the intentional neglect of the presently given. Reading is thus a
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wonderful example of the human being’s unique capacity to get intentio-
nally emancipated from the given, and be about anything imaginable.
5. Background: Aesthetic and Scientific
The path from the given to the possible is especially evident in the domain
of aesthetic perception and appreciation. But it is also no less evident in
observation and scientific judgment, in which much of what has already
been said of reading finds an even broader and more variegated field of ex-
pression. In art, and in science, an interpreter is required to make sense of
objects, and it is owing to the meanings attached to them by a skilled per-
ceiver and observer that they can become works of art and science. Not un-
like reading, both aesthetic and scientific messages are not ‘written down’
in the objects themselves, and so cannot be readily picked up, but have to
be deciphered against the backdrop of the competence instantaneously
supplied by the background infrastructure. This in turn requires investing
expectations and projections into the acts of perceiving and observing,
without which the physical objects would not be about works of art and sci-
ence whatsoever. For example, a painting is a ‘Mondrian’ if it is recognized
as such, and a glass object is an ‘electrode’ if the observer knows what the
eye conveys. In both cases, perceptions are about something that signifi-
cantly exceeds their merely visual features.
We can learn from the philosophy of science that there are no neutral
sense-data and self-evident facts. The sensed and the factual appear to us
in a variety of versions which are bounded by ‘truth’, on the one hand and,
and ‘falsity’, on the other. Thus contrary to widespread belief, decisions
pertaining to the scientific status of that which appears to us are not deter-
mined exclusively by the criterion of exactness, but are made according to a
tacit knowing of the background.
One of the characteristic features of the background infrastructure, as po-
inted out above, is that its nature is such that it cannot be formally repre-
sented. But the inability to formalize it does not necessarily make it
illusive, unreal or mysterious. On the contrary, this particular type of men-
tal infrastructure manifests itself in various ways, though not immediately
or explicitly. I would claim that the way we feel about things in the world,
and the attitudes which we have about them, is grounded in that back-
ground knowing which provides ‘reasons’ for our acting in the world. Such
a bodily raison makes us prefer some things and dislike others, feel good
about some people and cautious about others. It may also create the pre-
condition for someone to be a basketball fan rather than a baseball fan;
prefer sailing to flying; be fond of good food rather than enjoy playing
poker; prefer Bruckner over Mahler; enjoy the music of string quartets
more than opera; be fascinated with Picasso more than Pissarro; feel more
at home on the Adriatic than in the Alps. We can feel differently about the
‘same’ thing and feel the same about ‘different’ things. How we feel about
them is less the merit of the ‘given’ than it is the art of ‘taking’ what there
is. For this reason, we are sensitive to some things and ‘blind’ to others.
And that is why one person is fonder of Turner and another person is
fonder of Cézanne; why one person is touched by Schubert, and another by
Shostakovich; why some people are more impressed when standing in front
of Vermeer’s canvas, and others in front of Warhol’s picture.
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Similarly, judging somebody’s work – say, a lecture or a book – as either
‘interesting’ or ‘boring’ relies on some general understanding and intellec-
tual taste that cannot be fully transcribed via rational argumentation. A
judgment of this sort is the outcome of a bounty of elements which cannot
be singled out, decomposed or analyzed in a computational fashion. Judg-
ing people and their work as either ‘interesting’ or ‘boring’ may lack a ra-
tional grounding, but this does not automatically mean that ‘liking’ or ‘dis-
liking’ is completely blind, arbitrary or unfounded. It does, however, mean
that it is not possible to find a formula according to which the judgment is
done. The sought-after formula is lacking because it is not possible to for-
malize the background infrastructure from which the judgment originates.
But on that account it is neither irrational nor insignificant. Analogous to
the Pascalian ‘heart’,9 the background infrastructure has its ‘reasons’ that
are not accessible to propositionality.
To be or to appear ‘nice’ or ‘kind’, ‘boring’ or ‘weird’, is not due to any
clear-cut single feature or set of peculiarities. Instead, it is the outcome of
the general attitude or feeling one might have about a person – or, ex-
pressed otherwise, it is the product of many aspects that merge into a uni-
fied manifold which we cannot represent computationally.
The inability to formalize complex experiences such as music perception
does not mean that we cannot provide convincing rational arguments pro
or contra a positive appreciation of a piece of music. This is not the case,
and I certainly do not want to suggest that aesthetic feeling is most authen-
tic when it is blind or uneducated. Rather, what matters is that we can pro-
vide a diversity of arguments in favor of a piece of music, and equally pro-
vide a diversity of arguments to diminish its aesthetic value. But in the final
analysis, we learn to appreciate it or not according to whether it fits the to-
tality of experiential ‘infrastructure’ which remains propositionally non-
constituted.
By no means am I implying that no rational explanation (even if only a par-
tial one) of artistic preference is possible; but I certainly do want to claim
that such explanations are shaped by some more profound ‘feelings’ which
are not reducible to those explanations. After all, anything can be ex-
plained in one way or the other. Thus the capacity to give explanatory rea-
sons alone cannot be the ultimate argument, and it alone is not all that
counts. Our preferences in matters of taste are strongly colored by a whole
bunch of elements that exist under the label of ‘background infrastructure’.
Indeed, could one possibly think of an algorithm for that which constitutes
one’s (artistic or scientific) taste?
I can surely provide a pretty extensive list of reasons as to why I like
Bruckner’s symphonies, but this does not mean that the list exhausts my
‘love’ for his music, or that my appreciation is reducible to the reasons con-
tained in that list. In this context, an important issue arises: Does rational
argumentation help make us feel a particular way about things, or are the
arguments themselves already expressions of more fundamental feelings?
Or stated more straightforwardly: Is our appreciation of works of art pri-
marily about aesthetic arguments, or is it about more elementary feelings
that motivate such arguments? In other words: Do aesthetic reasons deter-
419
9
»Le Cœeur a ses raisons que la raison ne
connait point« (»The heart has its reasons
that reasons does not know«) – Blaise Pas-
cal, Pensée.
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mine the background, or are they already prepatterned by the background?
These types of questions require extensive discussion and exceed the scope
of this paper. Yet, for current purposes here, I would say that irrespective
of how intentional competence is defined, the way we feel about works of
art is very much dependent on the specific background ‘profile’ which is
not resistant to aesthetic arguments, but which cannot be reduced to them
– precisely because it entails many aspects that can be neither successfully
represented nor simulated.
The natural sciences are likewise not devoid of the extra-scientific, an as-
pect of which is taste (in the ‘transferred’ sense of the word). It is erroneous
to believe, for example, that by turning away from soft artistic experience
we also get rid of or lose the aboutness which is anchored in background
preferences, and which is not describable in formal terms, as we find in the
arts. Not even the ‘hard’ sciences are exempt from recourse to tacit premi-
ses which are articulated within the particular constellation of the back-
ground infrastructure, and which determine modes of aboutness even in the
domain of exact thought.
In one sense, it is possible to say that we are biased by the background, and
not only in perceiving. The manner in which we make theoretical choices
and judgments, be they scientific or aesthetic, is already background-laden.
Since this is the case, it is difficult to resolve disputes by means of rational
arguments and logic alone. Moreover, to understand why the same (scien-
tific) arguments are ‘sound’ for one person and completely unconvincing
for another, and why the same ‘brute facts’ are plausible for some scientists
and furiously rejected by others, requires that we appeal to background
‘criteria’.
Though not representable and formalizable, the embodied background in-
frastructure has nothing to do with irrationality, but rather with the totality
of experience and knowing, for which it is impossible to find a propositio-
nal form. I believe all this speaks in favor of a far-reaching general implica-
tion: science too is, first and foremost, a human activity. Even in matters of
science, namely, we act as embodied persons whose cognitive capacities
rely heavily, altogether unlike brains-in-vats, on skilled knowing, on back-
ground ‘taste’.
6. Implications for Intentionality
Even the simplest cognitive acts are not the result of the dictates of the
senses. To the question as to what sense data conveys, the only philosophi-
cally proper answer is: It depends! For as we have already seen, it depends
on expectations and projections based on the background infrastructure. In
addition, what the intentional object will be and how it is going to look de-
pends also on our needs, interests, curiosity, chance, experience, compe-
tence, ignorance, and so on. The ‘same thing’, then, will not only turn out
to be different according to the perspectives of different persons, but its
‘sameness’ will lose its stable status under the shifting focus of the inten-
tional preferences we and other persons have. For instance, the person that
suddenly appears ‘in front of your eyes’ can be an ‘unknown someone’, a
‘movie star’, a ‘pretty woman’, a ‘dear friend’, an ‘old love’, a ‘new neighbor’,
an ‘acquaintance from student days’, and so on. The ‘same person’ is de-
composed in a ratio which far exceeds 1:1 correspondence.
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Just as there is no ‘naïve’ eye or uneducated reader, there is also no ‘igno-
rant’ intentionality. External sources do not supply what mental states are
about, just as perception is not provided by visual stimuli, or language by
graphic signs and phonetic pitches. An experienced and competent mind is
needed to make aboutness possible in the first place. There are reasons to
believe that, without the background ‘know-how’, we would lack the cogni-
tive power necessary for mental states to be about things in the world.
There are no intentionally ‘given’ objects, just as there are no visually or
linguistically given objects. In going beyond the sensibly given, embodied
skill opens us room for intentional being-in-the-world, in the sense that is
not merely ecological. As paradoxical as it may seem, it is skill which makes
room for cognition and human creative intervening. Because we have
highly developed background skills, we can be artful in dealing with the
world, as well as describe it in scientifically exact terms. In short, we can be
aesthetically imaginative and scientifically adjusted because we perma-
nently have at our disposal a potentially massive repertoire of background
‘know-how’.
7. Background – The Organ of Potentiality
The skilled routine with which we make use of the background infrastruc-
ture does not only affect ‘higher’ mental functions, but extends its compe-
tence all the way ‘down’ to the bodily level. In this way, even the simplest
bodily reflexes become intentionally educated. And if I am not mistaken in
my reading of Merleau-Ponty, then it must be some such understanding
that is also present in his subtle reflection on the ‘reflex’:
»It is this global presence of the situation which gives a meaning to the partial stimuli and
causes them to acquire importance, value or existence for the organism. The reflex does not
result from objective stimuli (…). Prior to stimuli and sensory contents, we must recognize
(…) what our reflexes and perceptions will be able to aim in the world, the area of our possible
operations, the scope of our life.« (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 79; emphasis added)
This view accords with the one already mentioned above, that ‘objective
stimuli’ do not determine our mind-world. If in the previous section we
have seen that ‘higher’ cognitive functions (including science and art) are
background-laden, then we are now in a position to learn and realize that
the same holds true at the most elementary level of intentional ‘enworld-
ment’. Background ‘know-how’ is acquired through and embodied in an
organism’s most down-to-earth level, so that not even ‘reflexes’ and ‘im-
pulses’ are totally blind and unaided. Subsequently, it is possible to say that
‘enworldment’ is discernible at a very profound level of the mind’s about-
ness. In this way, like in the case of reading skill, we act intentionally to-
wards stimuli at a very basic level, rather than act according to it.
The body of skilled knowing is much more than the sum of past experi-
ences which is first routined, and then embodied as a skill. Moreover, due
to its self-organizing processes, it has a life of its own that we can neither
deliberately influence nor control. It has a sort of autonomy which, for that
reason, we cannot easily get rid of it or radically change – even when we
want to. We cannot simply forget or ignore our background infrastructure,
no matter how passionately we would like to do so (as a ‘fresh start’ in a
creative process, for instance). The background is always with us, and it is a
significant part of our ‘self’. The peculiarity of the background infrastruc-
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ture makes it a sort of blueprint of mentality. That is why I tend to say that,
being more than a propositional portrait or the particularity of qualia, it is
the uniqueness of the background which makes us differ individually from
one another.
Finally, there is a beneficial aspect of the background infrastructure that is
far from trivial: because it remains unconscious, we profit from its ‘know-
-how’ without even noticing. If this were not so, then it would not only be
energy consuming, but we would be stuck in trivialities – and that would
limit the scope of our mental actions. We would not be cognitively playful
due to the mental fatigue involved, and we would be consumed by the most
down-to-earth acts of survival. Luckily for us, this is not the case. Thus we
do not have to ‘think’ about the syntax of the words we use (at least not in
our native languages), just as we do not have to think about our heart beats
or the secretion of glands (so long as they do not malfunction). In making
itself ‘invisible’, that is, unconscious, background knowledge enables us to
be emancipated from the ‘given’ and the present, and to deal mentally
about the possible and not-yet-existing. This in turn legitimates background
knowledge as an organ of the potential. For in enabling the mind’s being
about things that do not exist, it facilitates mental leaps towards the possi-
ble. And, in the final analysis, it may extend ‘enworldment’ into the fic-
tional, and even the ‘impossible’.
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Zdravko Radman
Der Blick aus dem Hintergrund
Es herrscht allgemeine Einigkeit darüber, dass die Hintergundinfrastruktur unbewusst eingesetzt
wird und nicht formal vorstellbar ist. Die Meinungen gehen jedoch im Hinblick darauf auseinan-
der, ob diese Art Fertigkeit als Wissen im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes verstanden werden soll. Im
Artikel versuche ich zu zeigen, dass die Hindergrundinfrastruktur ein Typ des Wissens ist, der für
den Geist als Voraussetzung dient, um von den Dingen in der Welt zu sein. Im Gegensatz zur
gängigen Auffassung, der Hintergrund sei primär mechanisch, bestätigt die hier vorgestellte Ansicht,
dass er eine Wissenstotalität ist, vom Körper übernommen und in implizites Know-how verwandelt.
Er erscheint als ein Modus der »Verweltlichung« des Geistes und als ein Organ des Potentiellen.
Zdravko Radman
Une vue depuis les antécédents
Il y a presque unanimité à reconnaître que le savoir des antécédents est appliquée inconsciemment
et qu’elle n’est pas représentable formellement, mais les avis divergent quand il s’agit de décider si
ce genre d’aptitude doit être considéré comme un savoir au sens propre du terme. Dans cet article,
j’essaie de montrer que l’infrastructure des antécedents est un type de savoir technique constituant
une condition préalable pour que la pensée soit sur le monde. Contrairement à la conception
habituelle, selon laquelle les antécedents sont principalement mécaniques, le point de vue présenté
ici les définit comme totalité de savoirs empruntés au corps et transformés en savoir-faire implici-
te. Celui-ci se manifeste à la fois comme un mode d’»assimilation au monde« et un organe de po-
tentialité.
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